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Abstract 
The boundaries of nuisance have traditionally been tightly guarded. However, the 
tort’s underlying concern for the protection of property rights has provided it with 
sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing social and legal circumstances. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in Body Corporate 366611 v Wu represents the 
extension of private nuisance to remedy gaps in the tort’s application to the 
relationship between body corporates and individual proprietors under the Unit Titles 
Act 1972. The case concerned the defendant Body Corporate’s denial of access to an 
individual proprietor with an interest in the common property from which the 
nuisance ‘emanated’. Though the Court erred in its interpretation of existing nuisance 
principles relating to emanation, its decision can be rationalised on the basis that the 
plaintiff’s lack of control and restricted access speak to the core interests protected by 
the tort. Given the Court’s finding that access restrictions may be reasonably imposed 
upon occupiers under the Body Corporate’s modified rules, the decision’s limited 
effect is to provide an individual proprietor with a figurative right of access. Outside 
of clarifying these doctrinal uncertainties, the decision does not produce lasting 
ramifications for private nuisance. 
 
Key Words 
Torts; Nuisance; Emanation; Control; Access  
I Introduction 
The tort of nuisance is born from the need to protect the proprietary rights of 
individuals as they relate to land. The manner in which this protection is achieved is, 
however, hotly debated. Whilst, traditionally, property-based laws have been clearly 
delineated to provide certainty, the extent to which this applies to contemporary 
nuisance law is questionable.  
 
Following Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corporation,
1
 the question of the 
ability to sue for an interference emanating from an area in which the plaintiff 
retained an interest lay dormant. However, the recent decision of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Body Corporate 366611 v Wu
2
 has again thrust these issues into 
the legal spotlight.  The case highlights the historical boundaries that traditionally 
distinguished actions in nuisance and trespass, as well as the role of private nuisance 
in protecting rights of access. It also brings into question the fundamental function of 
                                                        
1
 Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corporation [1976] 2 NZLR 729 (SC). 
2 Body Corporate 366611 v Wu [2012] NZCA 614. 
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tort law in providing a remedy for interferences with land amidst a heavily regulated 
system of property law.  
 
This essay analyses the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and, in particular, explores 
the nature and the role of private nuisance as a mechanism for protecting rights of 
access. It concludes with the decision’s implications for the future of nuisance and 
commercial property arrangements of the kind involved. This discussion demonstrates 
that the novel circumstances in Wu legitimise the application of nuisance in this 
setting. However, the reasoning underlying the Court’s conclusions contains flaws, 
and highlights the need for further clarification of the law. 
 
II The Law of Nuisance 
A The Traditional Law  
Nuisance represents a tort against land,
3
 and was traditionally available only to protect 
rights in relation to the use and enjoyment of land.
4
 It has since diverged into two 
distinct torts, the distinction between which is not always apparent. Private nuisance 
consists of an interference with a private right in connection with land, whereas public 
nuisance involves an interference with a public right shared equally among the 
members of a community, such as a right to pass on a public highway.
5
 Unlike private 
nuisance, a person can sue in public nuisance only where they have suffered “special 
damage” differentiating their loss from that suffered by the rest of the community.
6
  
 
Private nuisance is defined as “a recurrent or persistent activity or state of affairs 
causing a substantial and unreasonable interference with the claimant’s land, or with 
his use or enjoyment of that land.”
7
 The use of nuisance or trespass was traditionally 
dependent upon whether the conduct complained of occurred on the plaintiff’s land.
8
 
Whilst trespass required the defendant’s act to occur directly on the plaintiff’s land, a 
                                                        
3 Donal Nolan “‘A Tort Against Land’: Private Nuisance as a Property Tort” in Donal Nolan and 
Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and Private Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2012) 459 at 461. 
4
 J Murphy The Law of Nuisance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 5. 
5
 JW Neyers and Jordan Diacur “What (Is) A Nuisance? Antrim Truck Centre Ltd v Ontario (Minister 
of Transportation” (2012) 90 Can Bar Rev 214 at 224. 
6
 At 224; citing Hicket v Electric Reduction Co of Canada (1970), 21 DLR (3d) 368 (Nfld SC). 
7
 Murphy, above n 4, at 33. 
8
 Paula Giliker “Nuisance” in Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds) Fleming’s the Law of Torts (10
th
 
ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) 487 at 496. 
 5
nuisance was traditionally available only where an interference emanated from 
outside this area.
9
 
 
Private nuisance requires two elements: a substantial interference with the rights of 
the plaintiff, and interference that is unreasonable in the sense of its effect upon the 
plaintiff.
10
 This substantiality requirement distinguishes nuisance from trespass, 
which is actionable per se.
11
 Interferences may materially affect the land itself, the 
plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of that land, or alternatively any servitude or similar right 
over land.
12
 The question of substantiality is generally regarded as a question of 
degree,
13
 with the claimant needing to demonstrate a “real interference” with the right 
to the use and enjoyment of their land.
14
 The paradigm for such infringing 
interference has been described as a “complete interruption of the use of land."
15
 
These indirect interferences may consist of smells,
16
 physical invasions,
17
 or even 
interferences causing emotional distress.
18
 However, in measuring substantiality, the 
courts have historically demonstrated a predilection to treat physical harm as 
substantial, rather than interferences with either use or enjoyment of land.
19
 
 
In assessing reasonableness, the law is less concerned with the unreasonableness of 
the infringing conduct as with the unreasonableness of the result.
20
 The focus of the 
analysis is upon achieving a “tolerable balance” between competing litigants,
21
 
meaning intervention is only justifiable where excessive use of property causes 
inconvenience beyond what could reasonably be expected.
22
 Both the duration of the 
                                                        
9 Giliker, above n 8, at 496. 
10
 Murphy, above n 4; Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
Tort Law (7
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 415. 
11
 Murphy, above n 4, at 35. 
12 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis, above n 10, at 414. 
13
 Gaunt v Fynney (1872) 8 Ch App 8, at 11-12 per Lord Selbourne; cited in Murphy, above n 4, at 35. 
14
 Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663 at 665. 
15
 Giliker, above n 8, at 500. 
16 Wheeler v J J Saunders [1995] 2 All ER 697. 
17
 Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316. 
18
 Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335 (CA). 
19
 Murphy, above n 4, at 43; citing P Cane The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997) 
at 90. 
20
 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis, above n 10, at 414. 
21
 Giliker, above n 8, at 499. 
22
 Giliker, above n 8, at 500; see Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 316; 64 ER 849, per Knight- 
Bruce V-C. 
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nuisance and the object of the defendant in undertaking the offending act are relevant 
to this inquiry.
23
 
 
B A Change in Approach 
Despite the traditionally rigid application of nuisance, its conceptual basis provides 
sufficient flexibility to accommodate changing social circumstances. Judicial 
commentary suggests the tort has “yet to be united under a coherent thread of general 
principle.”
24
 This denotes an inherent discretion within nuisance, which was cited by 
Asher J in the High Court in Wu as facilitating the law’s adaptation to the “changing 
circumstances of property ownership and developing community standards.”
25
  
 
This shift from orthodox nuisance principles was first contemplated in Clearlite 
Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corporation,
26
 where it was held that the disturbance of 
rights in land required a remedy regardless of the source of the alleged interference.
27
 
The conception of nuisance as a field of tort liability, focused upon the protection of 
property rights, might provide sufficient doctrinal flexibility to legitimise the 
stretching of nuisance principles in response to emerging contingencies. 
 
Despite judicial disquiet over the correctness of Clearlite,
28
 the decision remains 
intact. The re-emergence of these ideas in the case of Wu demonstrates that certain 
judges in New Zealand view nuisance as a means of protecting interests falling along 
the boundaries of the law’s current scope. The issue is whether the use of private 
nuisance as a mechanism for compensating such harm is too detached from traditional 
nuisance doctrine to be justified. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
23
 Giliker, above n 8, at 504; Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400 at 407 per Brett J. 
24
 A Mullis and K Oliphant Torts (4
th
 ed, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011) at 247; see also C 
Gearty “The place of private nuisance in a modern law of torts” (1989) 48 CLJ 214 at 214-216. 
25
 Wu v Body Corporate 366611 [2011] 2 NZLR 837 (HC) at [30]. 
26
 [1976] 2 NZLR 729 (SC). 
27
 Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corporation , above n 26, at 740. 
28 BP Oil New Zealand v Ports of Auckland Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 208 (HC). 
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III Background to Wu 
A The Unit Titles Act 1972  
The unit titles framework under which Wu acquired a registered title has 
ramifications for the body corporate-individual proprietor relationship that necessitate 
a basic understanding of the Unit Titles Act. The Act attempts to reconcile the 
existing property registration system with contemporary ownership models for flats 
and business premises.
29
 It provides the individual proprietor of a delineated stratum 
estate with the exclusive right to occupation and use. Common property areas are 
owned in common and managed by a body corporate, comprising all the individual 
proprietors of units in shares proportional to their unit entitlement.
30
 Both the body 
corporate and common property are seen as separate legal entities from the individual 
units and the associated individual proprietors.
31
 This distinction represents the 
fundamental theme of the statute and underpins the issues in Wu.
32
 Individual 
property is the realm of the individual registered proprietor, whereas ‘common 
property’ is “owned [in common] by all proprietors and must be managed by the body 
corporate for the common good of all.”
33
  
 
The Act provides default rules that prescribe conduct in relation to common 
property,
34
 and to individual units within the estate.
35
 Its underlying rationale is the 
need to provide for a democratic model to reconcile the differing interests associated 
with commercial property arrangements of the ilk involved in Wu.
36
 It is in the 
context of these interests that the Act imposes duties upon a body corporate,
37
 whilst 
conferring on the body corporate all powers reasonably necessary to carry out such 
                                                        
29
 G W Hinde et al Hinde, McMorland & Sim Land Law in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2005) Vol 1 at 14.022; cited in Body Corporate 188529 v North Shore City Council [2008] 3 NZLR 
479 (HC) at [84]. 
30
 Unit Titles Act 1972, s 9(1); World Vision of NZ Trust Board v Seal [2004] 1 NZLR 673 (HC) at 
[24]. 
31
 Unit Titles Act 1972, s 14(2). 
32 North Shore City Council, above n 29, at [97].  
33
 North Shore City Council, above n 29, at [97]. 
34
 The default rules binding all proprietors collectively as a body corporate are set out in Schedule 2 of 
the Act. These apply in the absence of a unanimous resolution to the contrary; see Unit Titles Act 1972, 
s 37(3). 
35
 Schedule 3 provides default rules that may be amended through a body corporate’s resolution at a 
general meeting; see Unit Titles Act 1972, s 37(4). 
36
 World Vision, above n 30, at [51]. 
37 See the Unit Titles Act 1972, s 15(1). 
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duties.
38
 These duties provide the background for the relevant conduct of Theta and 
Body Corporate 366611 in Wu. 
 
B The Facts of the Case and Procedural History 
The developer Sanctuary Group purchased Empire Apartments and converted it into 
student accommodation, which it advertised to prospective investors. Whilst in 
control of the body corporate, Sanctuary leased all units to Academic 
Accommodation Management Ltd (Academic) as building manager. All units were 
sold subject to this lease, with Academic undertaking to license each unit to student 
tenants. Wu subsequently became an owner and individual proprietor under this 
arrangement. In August 2007 Academic resigned from its role, with Theta appointed 
as building manager in its stead. However, the terms of the lease offered by Theta 
were substantially different from the prior arrangement. Most significantly, it required 
each individual proprietor’s accession to Security and Access Protocols (the 
Protocols) designed to mitigate safety and insurance problems that had arisen under 
Academic’s management. Wu refused to enter this modified lease. 
 
It is suspected that, on the 31 August, Academic terminated all occupation licences 
and changed the electronic locks. Proprietors who had not signed the Protocols were 
denied access to both common areas and their individual units. Subject to the 
accession of refusing proprietors, access remained restricted until December 2009. On 
14 October 2009 Wu issued proceedings in the High Court. Lang J concluded that 
these restrictions were unreasonable, and ordered that access be provided.
39
 
Consequently, in December 2009 electronic key cards were provided to Wu and 
others to allow access to common areas, at which point some proprietors were able to 
access their units. Wu subsequently brought these proceedings in private nuisance 
against the Body Corporate and Theta as its agent.  
 
 
 
                                                        
38
 Unit Titles Act 1972, s 16. 
39 Wu v Body Corporate 366611 (2010) 10 NZCPR 917 (HC) at [53]. 
 9
IV The Decisions 
A The High Court Decision 
Asher J’s decision in the High Court is relevant given the adoption by the Court of 
Appeal of many of the Judge’s conclusions upon the issue of emanation. Asher J 
reasoned that the relevant nuisance for the purposes of the analysis was the original 
reprogramming and maintenance of the electronic locks to prevent access.
40
 In 
considering that locking out constituted an actionable nuisance, Asher J deduced that, 
in the absence of any authority, the conduct was capable of doing so.
41
 Despite this, 
Wu’s claim appeared limited, as a nuisance action was only available where an 
interference emanated from outside the plaintiff’s land. The Judge therefore 
proceeded to consider whether the nuisance’s ‘emanation’ from property owned 
partly in common by the plaintiff precluded Wu’s private nuisance action – the 
‘emanation issue’.  
 
Asher J first justified his allowance of the emanation upon a theoretical basis, given 
that the focus of an investigation in nuisance was upon the relevant interest of the 
plaintiff, and not the defendant’s conduct.
42
 As a corollary to this, the Judge observed 
that there was a “lack of formalism about the law of nuisance, which has allowed it to 
adapt to the changing circumstances of property ownership and developing 
community standards.”
43
 Upon this basis, he reasoned that there was an inherent 
flexibility within the tort to adapt and provide a remedy in response to novel 
developments, such as that contemplated by the Unit Titles Act.  
 
The Judge then sought to justify his conclusion on the basis of control. He held that 
there was no need for the defendant to have a particular status as owner or occupier of 
adjacent land, provided the plaintiff did not retain “exclusive control” over the area 
constituting the source of the nuisance.
44
 Through reference to Hooper v Rogers,
45
 the 
Judge reasoned that co-owners were not precluded from bringing an action in 
                                                        
40
 Wu, above n 25, at [31]. 
41 Wu, above n 25, at [34]. 
42
 Wu, above n 25, at [29]. 
43
 Wu, above n 25, at [30]. 
44
 Wu, above n 25, at [30]. 
45 [1975] 1 Ch 43 (CA). 
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nuisance given their inability to control the actions of the other party.
46
 The Judge 
buttressed this with Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corporation, which had 
previously held that a nuisance emanating from neighbouring land did not represent a 
pre-requisite to a cause of action.
47
 
 
Finally, Asher J relied upon J Lyons & Sons v Wilkins
48
 and Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v 
Federated Confectioners Association of Australia
49
 in concluding that private 
nuisance may potentially provide a remedy in cases involving restricted access.
50
 
Asher J ultimately concluded that the fact that the actions were undertaken by 
defendants in common areas, co-owned by the plaintiff, did not preclude a nuisance 
action. He commented that the actions of Theta and the Body Corporate could not be 
materially distinguished from those of an adjoining owner or third party preventing 
access by way of its physical activities.
51
 
 
B The Court of Appeal Decision  
In the Court of Appeal, Heath J observed that the nuisance constituted the defendant’s 
refusal to supply an access card giving access to common property and the individual 
unit.
52
 The Judge commented that the refusal could have resulted from a decision of 
the defendant either inside or outside the Empire building.
53
  
 
Heath J reiterated Asher J’s finding that a successful action in private nuisance was 
not precluded by precedent, observing that the “authorities do not lay down any 
immutable rule that the interference must ‘emanate’ from land occupied or controlled 
by a defendant.”
54
 The Court then affirmed Asher J’s comments regarding exclusive 
control. It held that, so long as a plaintiff did not have exclusive control over the 
relevant area, there were no restrictions on the area from which a nuisance may 
emanate.
55
  
                                                        
46
 Wu, above n 25, at [30]. 
47 At [30]. 
48
 [1899] Ch 225 (CA) at 267 per Lindley MR and 271-272 per Chitty LJ. 
49
 [1986] VR 383 (SC). 
50
 Wu, above n 25, at [33]. 
51 Wu, above n 25, at [34]. 
52
 Body Corporate 366611 v Wu [2012] NZCA 614 at [94]. 
53
 At [94], per Heath J. 
54
 At [95], per Heath J. 
55 At [98], per Heath J. 
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Heath J upheld Wu’s private nuisance claim through analysing the nature of the Body 
Corporate under the Unit Titles Act 1972. In particular, he distinguished the Body 
Corporate’s rights and responsibilities in relation to common property from the rights 
of an individual proprietor in individual property, with the Body Corporate retaining 
sufficient independence to support a tort claim.
56
 Heath J observed that, regardless of 
whether the decision not to provide access was made on common property, the 
interference by the third party would constitute the tort.
57
 Further, the Judge noted that 
no earlier authority supported the argument that emanation from an adjacent property 
was a precondition to a successful private nuisance action.
58
 
 
In assessing reasonableness, Heath J referred to s 15(1) of the Unit Titles Act 1972 
and explained the nature of the Body Corporate’s duties, which included the 
maintenance of property and insurance.
59
 The Judge acknowledged that s 16 of the 
Act gave the Body Corporate the powers reasonably necessary to enable its 
performance of those duties.
60
 However, the Court differed from Asher J as to which 
version of the Body Corporate’s rules was applicable.
61
 Consequently, the Body 
Corporate was permitted to provide security keys restricting access on grounds of 
security, given the use of the premises as student accommodation.
62
 However, the 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that the accompanying discretion must be reasonably 
exercised, given the rule could not have been intended to arbitrarily prevent 
proprietors’ access to individual units.
63
 Consequently, the right to restrict access 
existed only where there were genuine concerns about property damage and 
vandalism adversely affecting insurance.
64
 In the present context, the restrictions 
placed upon Wu’s access were not reasonably necessary and therefore unjustified.
65
 
The defendants’ conduct thus constituted an actionable private nuisance. 
 
                                                        
56
 Wu, above n 52, at [97], per Heath J. 
57 At [97], per Heath J. 
58
 At [97], per Heath J. 
59
 At [59], per Heath J; referring to Unit Titles Act 1972, s 15(1). 
60
 At [61], per Heath J. 
61 At [63], per Heath J. 
62
 At [73], per Heath J. 
63
 At [74], per Heath J. 
64
 At [79], per Heath J, and [79] per Heath J. 
65 At [86], per Heath J. 
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Heath J then made an important distinction, observing that, while the restriction of 
access in these circumstances was unreasonable according to the access provisions, 
the Body Corporate could have restricted access to a potential licensee unless the 
licensee acceded to the relevant protocols.
66
 The Court consequently remitted the 
question of damages to the High Court, citing the difficulty in assessing damages 
where licensees could have been lawfully excluded from Wu’s unit.
67
 The outcome of 
the Court of Appeal’s decision differs from that in the High Court, as the access 
provisions validated by the Court of Appeal allow the reasonable restriction of 
occupiers.
68
 Under the High Court’s reasoning, the exclusion of occupiers in this 
manner would have been compensated.
69
 This difference is relevant when evaluating 
the overall implications of the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
 
V Analysis  
A The Nature of the Nuisance 
Before considering the emanation issue, it is appropriate to identify the relevant 
nuisance that the Court is concerned with. In the High Court, Asher J considered that 
the nuisance represented the act of originally reprogramming the locks and their 
subsequent maintenance, thereby restricting Wu’s access to common and individual 
property.
70
 The Court of Appeal framed the issue in a slightly different manner, 
observing that the nuisance constituted the defendant’s refusal to provide access cards 
to Wu and other affected proprietors.
71
 Both formulations are focused upon the 
defendant’s conduct in continually restricting access to the plaintiff. 
 
Given that the locks were changed electronically, however, it is difficult to frame the 
actual ‘source’ from which the nuisance emanated. This confusion is recognised by 
Heath J, who observed that the decision to refuse access could have been made either 
inside or outside the Empire complex.
72
 The fact that the remainder of the analysis in 
both decisions involves extensive consideration of the emanation issue indicates that 
                                                        
66
 Wu, above n 52, at [86], per Heath J; at [124], per Hammond J. 
67
 Wu, above n 52, at [89], per Heath J. 
68 Wu, above n 52, at [124], per Hammond J; at [129], per Hammond J. 
69
 Wu, above n 52, at [130], per Hammond J. 
70
 Wu v Body Corporate 366611 [2011] 2 NZLR 837 (HC) at [31]. 
71
 Wu, above n 52, at [94]. 
72 Wu, above n 52, at [94]. 
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each judgment considered the location of the locks themselves as the appropriate 
point of reference in considering the remainder of the analysis. However, neither 
judgment appears to consider this issue closely, preferring to found the acceptance of 
locking out as a basis for an actionable nuisance upon the absence of any prior 
precedent that such an act was incapable of doing so.
73
 The approach in both 
judgments implicitly suggests that both Asher J and the Court of Appeal saw 
themselves free to consider whether locking out was capable of supporting a nuisance 
action on the basis of first principles. The extent to which traditional nuisance 
doctrine supports this conclusion is considered later. 
 
1 Substantial interference 
The substantiality issue was largely overlooked by both the High Court and Court of 
Appeal. Rather, both courts implied that the complete disruption of an individual 
proprietor’s access to their own land always represents substantial interference.  
While there is support for this conclusion within legal literature,
74
 both judgments 
assume the point without discussing substantiality. 
 
The issue of substantiality is generally a question of degree,
75
 with the claimant 
needing to demonstrate a “real interference” with the right to the use and enjoyment 
of their land.
76
 This analysis is conducted objectively, in terms of any impact on the 
use of the land itself.
77
 One issue that emerges with this analysis is the effect of Wu’s 
position as a foreign investor upon the substantiality of any restricted access to the 
relevant individual property. The Canadian Supreme Court recently indicated that a 
substantial interference must “interfere to a significant extent with the actual use 
being made of the property.”
78
 This will be further explored later in this analysis. 
When applied to the actual circumstances of the plaintiff’s use in Wu, this statement 
may cause the substantiality of the alleged interference to be brought into question. 
                                                        
73
 Wu, above n 52 at [95]; Wu, above n 70, at [34]. 
74 Paula Giliker “Nuisance” in Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds) Fleming’s the Law of Torts 
(10
th
 ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) 487 at 500. 
75
 Gaunt v Fynney (1872) 8 Ch App 8, at 11-12 per Lord Selbourne. 
76
 Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663 at 665. 
77 Donal Nolan “‘A Tort Against Land’: Private Nuisance as a Property Tort” in Donal Nolan and 
Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and Private Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2012) 459 at 471. 
78
 Antrim Truck Centre Ltd v Ontario (Transportation) 2013 SCC 13 at [22] (emphasis added); citing 
St. Pierre v Ontario (Minister of Transportation and Communications) 1987 CanLII 60 (SCC) 1 SCR 
906 at 915. 
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As an overseas investor, Wu’s position as individual proprietor was almost 
exclusively for the purpose of licensing the property to individual student tenants. 
Following the Court of Appeal’s findings regarding the validity of any access 
restrictions placed upon these licensees, it is difficult to see how there could be any 
substantial interference with Mr Wu’s rights in actual use.  Given the plaintiff’s 
intended use, an argument exists that he was denied the opportunity to market his 
unit, with the intention of having tenants subsequently enter access protocols. Under 
the previous lease arrangement, this letting function had been discharged by 
Academic as building manager; the individual proprietors were not themselves 
responsible for obtaining individual tenants. In light of this, not only was Wu never in 
occupation of the unit, he was never responsible for acquiring licences from 
prospective tenants. To therefore claim that the denial of his opportunity to market the 
property represented a substantial interference would be at odds with Wu’s literal use 
of the land. 
 
However, to place such restrictions on a small subset of potential claimants by virtue 
of their novel situation of property ownership would be to unjustly dilute the rights 
afforded to all individual proprietors under contemporary property law. Consequently, 
regardless of the failure of both the High Court and Court of Appeal to undertake an 
assessment of substantiality, a principled view of the situation suggests that locking 
out should constitute a substantial interference capable of supporting a nuisance 
action. This follows from Wu’s status as individual registered proprietor, regardless of 
the purposes for which he obtained registration. 
 
B The Emanation Point 
1 A question of control 
One of the fundamental bases for the Court of Appeal’s finding that interferences in 
nuisance may emanate from land owned by the plaintiff is the notion of control. In the 
High Court, Asher J observed that the source of the emanation should not impede a 
private nuisance action, provided the plaintiff did not have exclusive control over the 
relevant area.
79
 This view was affirmed by Heath J in the Court of Appeal, who 
                                                        
79 Wu, above n 70, at [30]. 
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believed such an approach accorded with their views regarding the Body Corporate’s 
status and the irrelevance of the emanation’s source.
80
 
 
The distinction between having rights in and having exclusive control over the 
relevant area for the purposes of standing in private nuisance is a logical one. One of 
the primary justifications for retaining the emanation rule stems from the supposed 
ability of an owner or occupier to control any potentially harmful activity conducted 
upon his or her own land.
81
 In complex commercial property arrangements of the 
nature involved in Wu, the ability to distinguish between rights and control makes this 
analysis increasingly difficult.  
 
The delineation of responsibility and control is directly contemplated by the Unit 
Titles Act 1972. The fundamental theme of the Act is considered to be the distinction 
between individual units and common property.
82
 Individual property is largely the 
responsibility of the individual registered proprietor, whereas common property is 
owned and managed in common by the Body Corporate in accordance with the duties 
stipulated in its rules.
83
 The Body Corporate itself constitutes a distinct entity capable 
of being sued under its corporate name.
84
 The statute is also clear that, in the case of 
legal proceedings, common and individual property are to be considered separate 
premises.
85
 Heath J considered this sufficient to justify his findings as to control.
86
 It 
would be an anomalous distinction if, whilst capable of being the subject of a 
different legal action, an individual proprietor’s rights as a member of the Body 
Corporate prevented that individual bringing an action in private nuisance. If this 
distinction were allowed to stand in the absence of the Body Corporate’s accepted 
rules, an individual occupier would theoretically be able to sue in private nuisance, 
whereas the holder of the individual registered title would be precluded from doing so 
as a member of the Body Corporate. This result would be inconsistent with the 
rationale of nuisance as a land-based tort protecting the rights-holder from third party 
                                                        
80
 Body Corporate 366611 v Wu [2012] NZCA 614 at [97]. 
81
 Hooper v Rogers [1975] 1 Ch 43 (CA) at 51; also see Rosemary Martyn “Nuisance arising on the 
plaintiff’s land: the Clearlite case” (1979) 10 VUWLR 144 at 148. 
82 Body Corporate 188529 v North Shore City Council [2008] 3 NZLR 479 (HC) at [97]. 
83
 North Shore City Council, above n 82, at [97]; Unit Titles Act 1972, s 9(1). 
84
 Unit Titles Act 1972, s 13(1). 
85
 North Shore City Council, above n 82, at [89]; Unit Titles Act 1972, s 14(2)(a). 
86 Wu, above n 80, at [97]. 
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interference with those rights. Consequently, the distinction between rights in and 
control over land represents an appropriate means of reconciling the existing rules 
regarding emanation with the application of private nuisance to these circumstances. 
 
The absence of Wu’s control over the source of the nuisance is most evident in his 
inability to prevent the offending conduct. As an individual proprietor, Wu was only 
responsible for his individual property. His rights in the common property were 
limited in so far as he retained the right to vote upon matters of concern to the Body 
Corporate collectively.
87
 In relation to the Body Corporate’s support of ‘Security and 
Access Protocols’, Wu represented one of a small minority of proprietors who refused 
to enter into the amended lease agreement. As a result, Wu had little power to prevent 
the decision being taken to restrict access. This embellishes the merit found in 
distinguishing a plaintiff’s rights in land from their level of control over it, in order to 
preserve an action in private nuisance for diminution of those rights caused by an 
interference emanating from the relevant area. 
 
In reaching his conclusions upon control, Asher J in the High Court relied partially 
upon Hooper v Rogers. He reasoned that the decision supported the conclusion that 
one co-owner was not precluded from claiming in nuisance against the other owner, 
given their inability to control the actions of the other party.
88
 The Court of Appeal 
affirmed these findings as they related to the issue of control.
89
 Hooper concerned 
parties who were owners of adjacent farmhouses whilst co-owning the immediately 
surrounding land. The defendant undertook bulldozing works on sloped land beneath 
the plaintiff’s farmhouse, exposing the slope to soil erosion that would eventually 
compromise its supports.
90
 In considering private nuisance, Scarman LJ observed 
obiter that the plaintiff’s ability to control the actions of the co-owning defendant was 
no greater than that of a stranger.
91
 The plaintiff’s ownership position was therefore 
an irrelevant consideration, unless that position could be used to raise a defence of 
contributory negligence or volenti non fit injuria.
92
 This supports both Courts’ 
findings that Wu’s claim in private nuisance was possible on the basis that he lacked 
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sufficient control to avert the interference complained of. This is especially so given 
the analogous facts present in Wu, where there existed a similar arrangement of co-
ownership and occupation of common property from which the nuisance emanated.  
 
In affirming the High Court’s conclusion that earlier authorities do not support the 
emanation requirement, however, the Court of Appeal demonstrated a fundamental 
misunderstanding of prior precedent. In his judgment in Hooper, Scarman LJ 
observed that the claimant must prove “that the threat of damage to his land arises 
from acts or omissions of the defendant on his, the defendant’s, land.”
93
 The Judge 
based this observation on the fact that an owner retained the ability to exclude those 
likely to perpetrate a nuisance on his own property.
94
 As will be demonstrated shortly, 
these ideas are not limited to the observations of Scarman LJ in Hooper. This implies 
that the statement by Heath J in the Court of Appeal that the Court was free to 
consider the matter effectively res integra was manifestly unfounded. Conversely, 
whilst the authorities may support the more limited distinction between control and 
rights in land for the purposes of private nuisance, they potentially do not support a 
wider deviation from traditional nuisance principles. 
 
Another case that supports this control distinction is Clearlite Holdings Ltd v 
Auckland City Corporation.
95
 Whilst the decision was relied upon by Asher J in the 
High Court as supporting the contention that a nuisance emanating from neighbouring 
land did not represent a pre-requisite to a cause of action,
96
 the case is not mentioned 
by the Court of Appeal. This seems odd given the precedent speaks to the exact 
emanation issue at the heart of the litigation. The circumstances in Clearlite involved 
the Auckland City Corporation employing the second defendant to lay new drainage 
pipes. In the absence of negligence, the digging of a tunnel to carry the pipes caused 
the concrete floor of the plaintiff’s factory, located directly above, to crack.
97
 
Contrary to the observations of the Court of Appeal, Mahon J explicitly quoted the 
commentary in Salmond on Torts (16
th
 ed)
98
 that a “nuisance must have arisen 
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elsewhere than in or on the plaintiff’s premises.”
99
 Further, the Judge acknowledged 
the decision in Titus v Duke,
100
 where the plaintiff, as a lessee of premises upon which 
a rotted tree branch had fallen and caused damage, was denied a remedy in private 
nuisance because the alleged interference stemmed from land in his occupation.
101
 
Despite this precedent, Mahon J observed that the proposition in Titus that liability for 
private nuisance was necessarily predicated upon the defendant being the owner or 
occupier of the adjacent was incorrectly decided.
102
  
 
The main difficulty faced by Mahon J in reconciling Titus and traditional nuisance 
principles with the particular facts of Clearlite stemmed from the plaintiff’s lack of 
control over the source of the interference.
103
 This had arisen by virtue of the 
defendant’s statutory responsibility for the tunnel that represented the source of the 
relevant emanation. It is these same ideas of control that preclude the reconciliation of 
the Court of Appeal’s conclusions in Wu with traditional nuisance doctrine. In relation 
to the facts in Clearlite, academic commentary has suggested that the nature and 
extent of the defendant’s control over the area from which the nuisance emanated 
meant that it was not a case in which the nuisance was committed on the plaintiff’s 
land.
104
 
 
It is therefore the absence of control, not the presence of an emanation from adjacent 
land, which is determinative. This is evident in Clearlite, where it is easier to 
rationalise the Court’s decision on the basis of the plaintiff’s lack of control than it is 
to frame the relevant emanation. In the context of Wu, were the locks to be changed 
manually, rather than remotely, Wu would potentially still suffer sufficiently limited 
control to sustain an action, despite the absence of any ‘emanation’. With the 
increasing difficulty faced in framing an emanation in contemporary nuisance, it is 
arguably more appropriate to qualify nuisance actions on the basis of control than 
through a strict emanation requirement. To this extent, the conclusion of the Court of 
Appeal in Wu regarding the plaintiff’s control can be justified on the grounds that it 
does not represent a substantial deviation from nuisance principles. Conversely, the 
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decision represents a necessary development to fill a lacuna within a heavily regulated 
property system whereby owners and occupiers have experienced diminished control 
over their own land. 
 
Whether Clearlite can be used to justify the wider abolition of the requirement of an 
emanation from the defendant’s adjacent land is a separate question. Whilst the 
decision arguably dispenses with the requirement of emanation, this approach has 
been criticised in both judicial and academic circles. R S Chambers’ commentary 
upon the decision postulates that Mahon J’s judgment was erroneously decided.
105
 
The author believed the only justification for the ultimate result in the case was the 
plaintiff’s lack of control, a factor that led the author to “applaud the result, if not the 
reasoning.”
106
 The wider effect of Mahon J’s decision was also criticised in BP Oil 
New Zealand Limited v Ports of Auckland Limited,
107
 where Rodney Hansen J 
observed that there existed “no reason in law or justice to extend nuisance beyond its 
established boundaries.”
108
 In this instance, the Judge considered that remedies, such 
as negligence and trespass, already existed for injury to land caused by acts upon it.
109
 
The question therefore remains whether, in situations in which the plaintiff has no 
recourse to any alternative legal remedy, the extension of private nuisance can be 
justified in providing one. 
  
It is unclear how influential the Clearlite decision was upon the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal. While Heath J affirmed the conclusions of Asher J in the High Court in 
relation to control,
110
 Clearlite itself is not discussed. Although this illustrates a 
degree of judicial oversight here on behalf of the Court of Appeal, the decision still 
provides some justification for their conclusions in so far as they are based upon Wu’s 
absence of control. However, the misguided conclusions of the Court of Appeal 
regarding their ability to rule upon the wider emanation issue res integra suggests a 
more principled look at the theoretical justifications for the rule is required. 
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2 Theoretical justifications for the extension of nuisance 
The question remains whether the need to vindicate the rights at the core of 
nuisance’s protection outweighs adherence to established principles. One of the 
functions of private nuisance is to reconcile the rights of adjacent land users to 
maximise the use of their proprietary rights.
111
 The reasonableness component of the 
analysis, whereby the rights of adjacent land users are balanced in accordance with 
the context surrounding the land use, demonstrates this. The analysis is predicated 
upon achieving a “tolerable balance”,
112
 aimed at facilitating each individual’s 
enjoyment of their proprietary rights, whilst regulating use to protect the equivalent 
rights of adjacent land users. The premise of this analysis is that nuisance is a tort 
against land.
113
 This principle has formed the basis for judicial resistance to change in 
other areas of nuisance. This is evident from the refusal of the House of Lords in 
Hunter v Canary Wharf to uphold the Court of Appeal’s ruling that standing in 
private nuisance extended to non-occupiers of the affected property.
114
 The reason for 
the hesitancy to extend the tort’s scope in this manner stems from the fact that torts of 
this nature are not free-standing causes of action, but rather represent “constituent 
elements of the wider law of property.”
115
 This focus upon the land itself is the reason 
why the law looks to the infringing conduct’s “harmful result” and not the nature of 
the conduct itself.
116
 Such considerations have informed the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s belief that there is not a ‘typology’ of types of nuisance.
117
  
 
As a result of this land-based analysis, there exists some prima facie justification for 
the Court of Appeal’s conclusions upon the emanation issue. Wu retained rights in his 
individual property by virtue of his individual registered title. Consequently, 
independently of Wu’s position vis-à-vis the Body Corporate, there exist a series of 
proprietary rights, including access, which private nuisance primarily exists to protect. 
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Adherence to the principles that have shaped the tort’s development should not 
preclude it being used to provide a remedy where one is merited. 
 
The historical basis for the law’s approach to emanation was the distinction between 
the actions of trespass and nuisance.
118
 Traditionally, any interference that consisted 
of a physical act occurring directly on the plaintiff’s land was considered a trespass, 
with nuisance limited to interferences emanating from outside the plaintiff’s land.
119
 
However, this distinction cannot be relied upon in upholding the emanation principle 
in the context of modern property arrangements. The longstanding nature of the rule 
does not conceal the fact that it originated at a time when complex commercial 
property arrangements, such as stratum estates under the Unit Titles Act 1972, were 
beyond contemplation. The emanation principle thus stems from a time in which the 
concepts of occupation/ownership and control were incapable of distinction. This fact 
should not preclude the law developing in accordance with changing social and legal 
circumstance.  
 
Much has been made of the lack of any coherent, unified principle within private 
nuisance.
120
 Whilst this may cause inherent uncertainty and confusion within the 
law,
121
 it provides private nuisance with the flexibility to adapt to these changing 
circumstances in order to vindicate the rights of land users. Both Asher J and the 
Court of Appeal believed this justified extending the ambit of private nuisance to the 
present facts.
122
 The Court of Appeal’s conclusions appear logical when analysing the 
overall result of the decision through the lens of traditional nuisance principles. After 
all, tort law’s foremost function is to compensate harm,
123
 or, where the nuisance is 
ongoing, to enjoin the relevant state of affairs. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
plaintiff’s ability to control the nuisance was limited. It follows that, in situations such 
as the present, where the plaintiff has recourse to no other legal remedy, the extension 
of private nuisance to vindicate an individual proprietor’s right of access is justified.  
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C Private Nuisance and the Issue of Access  
A significant tension underlying both Courts’ judgments in Wu is the perceived need 
to provide a remedy in cases of restricted access. The protection of such fundamental 
incidents of property ownership has led to the blurring of private and public nuisance, 
particularly within the Canadian courts.
124
 The issue therefore becomes the extent to 
which the Court of Appeal based its judgment upon the need to provide a remedy for 
restricted access, and whether the use of private nuisance to achieve such aims is 
appropriate. 
 
One indication that the Court of Appeal’s decision attempts to use private nuisance to 
resolve what is conventionally a public nuisance issue is the nature of the facts in Wu. 
If Wu were the registered proprietor of a property accessed by way of a public 
highway, any denial of access would likely constitute public nuisance, as Wu would 
be able to demonstrate that he had suffered special damage capable of supporting the 
action.
125
 However, the actual nature of Wu’s individual property necessitated that he 
proceed through common areas in order to access his unit. The actions of the Body 
Corporate in restricting access did not therefore infringe a wider right held by the 
public, but one specific to the individual proprietors who were denied access. This 
necessitated Wu’s reliance on private nuisance as a means of vindicating his right to 
access. 
 
The Courts’ focus upon access is evident from the nature of the cases cited in the 
judgment of Asher J. The Judge first discussed the flexible nature of nuisance, citing J 
Lyons & Sons and Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd as examples of this alleged flexibility.
126
 
Both cases represent dubious exemplars, given their reputation as ‘watching and 
besetting cases’ in which the application of private nuisance has been subsequently 
questioned.
127
 J Lyons  & Sons involved the picketing of the plaintiff’s works by the 
defendant’s employees. The primary focus of the litigation was upon the defendant’s 
liability for watching and besetting under s 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of 
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Property Act 1875.
128
 The Court’s discussion of private nuisance only arose due the 
defendant’s assertion that such conduct was lawful unless private nuisance was 
established. Thus while Lindley M.R. and Chitty LJ both entertained the possibility of 
private nuisance obiter, their limited discussion of the tort reflects its ancillary nature 
within the decision. Similarly, Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd involved the picketing of the 
plaintiff’s premises whereby the defendants caused disruption to the plaintiff’s 
business.
129
 In the Victorian Supreme Court, Murphy J found that the occupation of a 
roadway causing hesitation to proceed constituted ‘besetting’ amounting to nuisance 
at common law.
130
 The Judge’s conclusions, whilst founded heavily upon the decision 
in J Lyons & Sons, also failed to define whether the relevant action was sourced in 
private or public nuisance. 
 
Asher J’s reliance upon these two cases as support for the use of private nuisance to 
provide a remedy in access cases is therefore questionable. Firstly, the two cases 
represent a significant stretching of private nuisance to cover what is ostensibly a 
public nuisance issue. The second issue is whether the prevention of something 
entering the land, as was the case in restricting Wu’s access, is inconsistent with 
general conceptions of what a nuisance is. There consequently exists the argument 
that such issues are better handled under causes of action other than private 
nuisance.
131
 This suggests a more detailed look at potential remedies for those cases 
falling along the boundaries of private nuisance beyond the scope of this essay is 
warranted. Ultimately the extent to which the Court of Appeal based its conclusions 
upon considerations of access is unclear, given its judgment simply affirms the 
conclusions of Asher J in the High Court. In doing so, the Court of Appeal arguably 
implicitly accepted this reasoning. This aside, the courts have been increasingly 
willing to use private nuisance as a mechanism to resolve such issues.
132
 
 
An important point of reference in considering the applicability of private nuisance to 
access cases following Wu is the later decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
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Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. v Ontario (Transportation).
133
 The plaintiff operated a truck 
stop complex that serviced users of a highway over a period of 26 years. The 
respondent public authority subsequently opened an adjacent stretch of highway, 
altering the existing highway and thereby restricting access to the appellant’s 
premises and damaging their business. The case was brought as a claim for damages 
for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act – an action for which damages 
were awarded if a right of action for damages existed at common law independently 
of the statute.
134
 As a result, the Antrims were required to establish a cause of action 
under private nuisance. 
 
In approaching the matter, the Canadian Supreme Court undertook a similar analysis 
to that of the Court of Appeal in Wu. The Court emphasised that there was not a 
‘typology’ of actionable nuisances but rather a threshold of sufficient seriousness.
135
 
While not concerned with the issue of emanation, the case represents an example of 
judicial willingness to use private nuisance to provide a remedy in cases of restricted 
access. This willingness is especially notable given that public nuisance was available 
on the facts. One possible explanation for this is that the potential damages available 
under private nuisance were much greater than those at public nuisance, given the 
manner in which consequential economic loss was handled under the latter tort.
136
  
 
One factor complicating the use of private nuisance in this context is the apparent 
inconsistency of the emanation requirement with issues of access. Unlike paradigm 
nuisance cases in which there is a tangible ‘emanation’, such as noise, access cases 
consist of ‘blocking’. In Hunter v Canary Wharf,
137
 the House of Lords refused to 
uphold the plaintiffs’ contention that an adjacent building that blocked television 
signals constituted a nuisance.
138
 However, Lord Cooke’s dissent partly stemmed 
from his perception that a reasonable user should abide by such interferences.
139
 This 
leaves open the question whether private nuisance will be available where there is a 
denial of a more substantial right, such as a complete interruption of access. Courts 
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have previously been willing to allow nuisance actions in respect of interferences with 
analogous proprietary rights, such as easements over land.
140
 Given the similar 
interests protected in these cases, the extension of private nuisance to vindicate these 
rights is amply justified. 
 
Another justification is the predilection evident in recent decisions for Canadian 
courts to merge private and public nuisance in access cases, particularly where there 
has been a restriction upon public rights to use a highway resulting in unreasonable 
interference with individual rights to use and enjoyment.
141
 This position lends 
support to the Court of Appeal’s use of private nuisance in protecting an individual’s 
right of access. Unlike in Antrim, there was no recourse to public nuisance as a means 
of vindicating Wu’s rights. Consequently, there is support for the use of private 
nuisance to fulfil this purpose. 
 
VI Implications of the Decision and Conclusions 
The Court of Appeal’s conclusions upon the issue of emanation seem alarming given 
its apparent refusal to recognise the emanation rule. However, the decision’s effect is 
limited by the Court’s findings as to reasonableness and damages. Essentially the 
finding of the Court of Appeal that the parties’ accepted version of the Body 
Corporate’s default rules distinguished between individual proprietors and occupiers 
enabled it to reasonably restrict access.
142
 Heath J subsequently observed that, while it 
would be unreasonable to exclude an individual proprietor from common property 
(barring extreme circumstances), such restrictions were logical when imposed upon 
student occupiers.
143
  
 
These conclusions therefore limit the decision’s effect beyond providing the 
individual proprietor figurative access, detached from any meaningful right to market 
and license the unit. The sole purpose of Wu’s acquisition of the unit was to license 
the premises to prospective tenants. Given that Wu exhibited no intention to occupy 
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the unit, it is unclear what relief the Court of Appeal’s decision provides beyond 
facilitating nominal access. This is reflected in the fact that the Court remitted the 
assessment of damages to the High Court, citing an absence of consequential 
economic loss given Wu’s inability to license the unit without acceding to Theta’s 
Security and Access Protocols.
144
 This is a logical result, providing the individual 
registered proprietor with the fundamental right to access, whilst balancing his use of 
the property against the interests of fellow members of the Body Corporate as part of 
a commercial property arrangement he knowingly entered into. This accords with the 
dual function of private nuisance in protecting rights in land whilst achieving a 
balance between the rights of adjacent landowners. 
 
The effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision may be more evident if the plaintiff were 
in the position of an owner-occupier. Its conclusions upon the reasonableness of 
access restrictions upon prospective tenants centred on the need for the Body 
Corporate to make adequate provision for safety and insurance considerations.
145
 
Based upon this reasoning, if the plaintiff were to occupy the unit, such access 
restrictions would be justified under the accepted version of the Body Corporate’s 
rules. To reach this conclusion may place a gloss on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning 
however, as its conclusions upon reasonableness are predicated upon the occupation 
of individual units by student tenants on a significant scale. To infer that this would 
result in a reasonable restriction of access to an owner/occupier with a registered title 
may take the reasoning beyond the Court of Appeal’s scope of contemplation. This is 
because the Body Corporate’s rules were amended to reflect the specific ownership 
arrangement at issue. Consequently, the unlikelihood of an owner-occupier 
arrangement arising in a situation governed by a Body Corporate’s rules in this 
manner renders this discussion largely hypothetical. 
 
In the context of private nuisance generally, the effect of the decision is limited. The 
Court of Appeal’s conclusions are more appropriately viewed as a limited extension 
of private nuisance to cover a lacuna within the law’s scope of protection as a result 
of the particular facts of the case. This is even more pronounced if the decision is 
considered as being predicated on the plaintiff’s lack of control. In this instance, the 
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frequency with which the boundaries of private nuisance are likely to be tested in this 
manner is limited. The primary scenario will be that in which some sort of co-
ownership or co-occupation agreement exists between two parties. As was 
demonstrated in Hooper,
146
 the law has been able to provide a remedy in such 
scenarios without drastically altering the nature of private nuisance. 
 
One area in which this concept of control may become relevant is in a similar lease 
arrangement to that found in Titus v Duke.
147
 In that situation, the lessee’s possessory 
right to the relevant land precluded their claim against the property’s owners in 
private nuisance, despite their inability to effect the removal of the ultimate cause of 
the damage.
148
 Were the case to be heard again, it is possible that this concept of 
control could result in the extension of private nuisance in order to provide a remedy. 
However, this result is likely to be unnecessary, given the statutory scheme that 
governs property law in situations of this nature. The Court of Appeal’s extension of 
private nuisance in Wu is a direct result of the plaintiff’s inability to obtain a legal 
remedy by other means. Consequently, the lasting effect of the decision is likely to be 
limited by both its narrow scope and the fact that gaps of this nature are relatively rare 
within property law. Generally speaking, cases in which the application of the concept 
of control is necessary are likely to be few.  
 
A Conclusion 
Private nuisance is fundamentally concerned with the protection of rights in land. The 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Wu can be viewed as a reflection of this. While 
private nuisance has traditionally excluded interferences that emanate from an area in 
which the complainant has an interest, the decision reflects the necessity of adapting 
the law to changing social and legal circumstances. Further, if the decision is framed 
from the perspective of the plaintiff’s lack of control, the case represents a logical 
justification for the extension of the tort that accords with private nuisance’s 
protection of proprietary rights. This approach is also consistent with the tort’s 
theoretical basis, and can be reconciled with the existing emanation rules on the 
grounds of flexibility and of the need to provide a remedy where none currently 
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exists. As illustrated by the Canadian case of Antrim,
149
 there is also precedent for the 
slackening of private nuisance principles in cases of restricted access. 
 
Despite this, the manner in which the Court of Appeal justified its decision was 
riddled with inaccuracies and uncertainty. While the Court correctly cited the 
plaintiff’s lack of control as grounds for extending or avoiding the existing emanation 
rule, its judgment failed to clarify a number of significant points. Firstly, the Court’s 
refusal to acknowledge the existence of established emanation rules flouts traditional 
nuisance principles. The Court therefore failed to consider precedent that may have 
helped reinforce the judges’ conclusions, particularly the decisions of Hooper and 
Clearlite that speak to the issue of control. In failing to address much of the High 
Court’s reasoning regarding emanation, the Court failed to clarify the grounds upon 
which the decision was ultimately based. Were the Court to acknowledge the control 
distinction and the need to provide a remedy for restricted access as bases for its 
decision, its conclusions upon the emanation issue would have been more acceptable. 
The result is consequently more justified than the manner in which it was reached. In 
any event, the limited effect of the decision beyond filling a minor gap in existing 
property law and in providing a symbolic right of access means the decision is 
unlikely to have wider ramifications upon private nuisance. Regardless of the 
decision, Wu’s impending appeal to the Supreme Court will allow for greater 
consideration of these issues and the future direction taken by the courts in the area of 
private nuisance.  
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